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The Application of the "Revised
Principle of Alternate
Possibilities" in a Causality
Determined Universe.
Nicholas Michaud

According to Henry J. Frankfurt, the
claim that “ought implies can” is taken by
many philosophers as so foundational as to
almost be considered an “a priori” truth. In his
paper “Alternate Possibilities and Moral
Responsibility,” Frankfurt challenges this
assumption. He proposes the “revised
principle of alternate possibilities,” asserting
that we intuitively absolve agents of moral
responsibility only if they act solely because
they could not do otherwise. Ten years later,
John Martin Fischer challenges Frankfurt’s
claim, asserting that this cannot be the case if
an agent exists within a universe governed by
actual sequence causation and therefore,
moral accountability and determinism remain
non-reconcilable. These seemingly
incompatible claims may be reconcilable after
thorough analysis of intentionality. Even in
the face of existence within a nominologically
inevitable determinism, a kind of “Error
Theory Compatibalism” is feasible.
There is a common ground upon
which those who believe human beings have
freewill and those who do not often meet.
There is little contention between them that if
agents do not have freewill, these same agents
then cannot be held responsible for their
actions. The specific reason for this is the
belief that a moral agent can be held morally
responsible for actions if and only if the agent
could have done otherwise. Harry G.
Frankfurt refers to this as "the principle of
alternate possibilities." In his article Alternate
Possibilities and Moral Responsibility
Frankfurt boldly asserts that "the principle of
alternate possibilities is false."1 Frankfurt

believes that he can provide examples of
circumstances in which there are no alternate
possibilities and the agent is still held morally
responsible for the act. Twelve years later, in
his article Responsibility and control, John
Martin Fischer addresses Frankfurt's
argument and contends that the
incompatibilists--those who believe that
determinism and responsibility are
incompatible--may still agree that
responsibility does not require control.
Fischer asserts that Frankfurt's argument
relies upon the premises that not only is
responsibility separate from control (control
in the sense that an agent has more than one
option), but additionally that moral
responsibility, if separated from control, is
compatible with determinism. Fischer then
argues that Frankfurt successfully proves that
an agent can lack control and maintain moral
responsibility, but he goes on to argue that
moral responsibility is still incompatible with
causal determinism.
It is generally taken for granted that
determinism and moral responsibility are not
compatible. It is assumed that for an agent to
possess freedom of will, the agent must have
more than one option from which to choose.
To this Frankfurt replies “[t]here may be
circumstances that constitute sufficient
conditions for a certain action to be performed
by someone and that therefore make it
impossible for the person to do otherwise, but
that do not actually impel the person to act or
in any way produce his action.”2 Frankfurt’s
first example addresses the case of coercion.
It is generally agreed upon that if an agent is
coerced into doing something, that agent is
not morally responsible for his or her
behavior. Frankfurt’s example follows the
following form: let us say that Jones has been
threatened with a harsh penalty by Black.
Specifically, if Jones does not do as Black
demands Black will kill him. In this case let
us say that Black wants Jones to smack a
different agent –Carl—on the back of the
head. Ironically for Jones, (perhaps luckily)
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he had already decided that he really wanted
to smack agent Carl’s head, and furthermore,
was about to do so when Black so rudely
interrupted with his death threat. Frankfurt
proposes that in order to determine if Jones is
morally responsible, an understanding of the
kind of person Jones is must be reached. If
Jones has only one option, it seems counterintuitive to absolve Jones of moral
responsibility for smacking Carl on the back
of the head if he was already planning to do
so. It seems, then, that the principle of
alternate possibilities is already weakening.
The essential question is, then, “why did Jones
smack Carl on the back of the head?”
Frankfurt breaks down Jones’ motivation in
the following way: is Jones an unreasonable
or a reasonable person? He asserts that if
Jones is an unreasonable person he will either
not care about the threat or be overwhelmed
by it to a mind-numbing degree. Jones might
be the kind of person who will do whatever he
wants to do regardless of threats presented to
him. If Jones is unconcerned about the threat
and acts as if the threat is not present, then it
cannot be said it was the threat that motivated
him to act. Instead, it seems that Jones is
responsible for his action because the threat
has no effect on him. If, on the other hand,
Jones is the kind of person who is
overwhelmed by the slightest threat to his
well-being, and would do anything necessary
to preserve it, Jones might then not be held
morally responsible for his action. If Jones
was going to smack Carl on the back of the
head, but when presented with the threat by
agent Black completely forgets his original
intention and does whatever agent Black
wants, acting without any thought or
consideration other than for that of his own
welfare, he cannot be said to be motivated by
his original intention. In this case of the
unreasonable Jones, Jones is not held
responsible for his action as he acted solely
due to the threat made by agent Black.
Frankfurt then considers the possibility of a
reasonable Jones. If Jones neither ignores the
threat, nor is terrified to the point of stupidity
by it, Jones might still be held responsible for

his action. He has not forgotten, nor ignores,
his original intention. If Black demands that
he do other than Jones originally intended,
Jones would--most reasonably--do as Black
demands. As it is, Jones is quite happy that he
gets to do what he originally wanted to do.
Jones gladly smacks Carl on the back of the
head. In this case, Jones seems to maintain
responsibility for his action, though he lacks
control. To quote Frankfurt: “It was not the
threat that led him to act, though it would
have done so if he had not already provided
himself with a sufficient motive for
performing the action in question.” 3 If the
principle of alternate possibilities is correct,
regardless of Jones' motivation, he must not
be held accountable for his action. This would
be a difficult conclusion to reach while
listening to Jones chuckle in the background,
reveling in joy because he acted in the way
that he did. It seems, instead, that in instances
of coercion it is not the fact that the
threatened agent has only one option that
absolves the agent of moral responsibility, but
because the agent acts solely due to coercion.
After exploring this situation and
Jones’ motivation, Frankfurt addresses the
obvious counter-argument: although Jones is
being coerced, and even if he is a reasonable
man, he still retains the ability to do otherwise
even though it would result in his immediate
death. Frankfurt addresses this objection by
altering his example in the following way:
Black can manipulate Jones without Jones’
knowledge. Specifics concerning the
mechanism of this manipulation are
unnecessary. All that needs to be known is
that Black, without Jones’ knowledge, can
force Jones to do his will. As in the previous
case, let us suppose that Black wants Jones to
smack agent Carl on the back of the head.
Unlike the previous case, Black would like to
keep his involvement in this matter secret. So,
by using his secret power of manipulation
(whether scientific or psychic), Black will
make sure that Jones smacks Carl on the back
of the head. In order to minimize the
possibility that his secret is revealed Black
3
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will only use his power in the case that Jones
indicates in some way that he intends on
doing other than Black desires. Perhaps Jones
suffers from a serial smacking-people’s-heads
disorder, and whenever he decides to smack
his next victim his left eyebrow raises.
Conversely, every time he decided not to
smack someone, his left eyebrow lowers.
Watching carefully, Black notes a distinct
raise in Jones’ eyebrow and knows that Jones
will now smack Carl on the back of the head.
With this knowledge, Black rests easy
knowing that he does not have to use his
power to achieve his desired result. Jones,
once again with great joy in his heart, smacks
Carl on the back of the head, with no
interference or involvement by Black. In this
situation, Jones can follow only one possible
path. He will, whether he decides to or not,
smack Carl. It would seem, though, that if
Jones decides to smack Carl, and does so
without the involvement of Black, he should
be held morally responsible for the action
even though, regardless of his decision, he
must smack Carl. Conversely, if Jones
decides not to smack Carl but is then forced to
by Black, it would seem necessary to absolve
Jones of moral responsibility. In this way,
Frankfurt means to demonstrate the error of
the principle of alternate possibilities.
With examples similar to the
preceding in mind, Frankfurt revises the
principle of alternate possibilities. Frankfurt
argues that an agent is morally absolved only
when the agent acted solely due to external
coercion. In essence, had Jones intended to
not smack Carl, but was forced too, and the
only reason he did so was because he was
forced too, then--and only then--can it be said
that he is not morally responsible. Frankfurt’s
revision of the principle states: “a person is
not morally responsible for what he has done
if he did it only because he could not have
done otherwise.”4 Absolution, then, is not a
result of the lack of alternate possibilities.
Instead, absolution is granted as a result of the
intention of the agent. Frankfurt’s intuition
also works in the reverse. It seems natural to
4
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give praise to a child who has shared a toy
with another child even with the knowledge
that had the child decided not to share, we
would have forced the child to share the toy.
Moral praise is often given in situations
where, upon reflection, the conclusion was
inevitable but we believe the agent acted with
the right motivation.
Fischer’s argument attacks the actual
deterministic quality of Frankfurt’s examples.
In true causal determinism it would seem that
even an agent’s intentions are not her own but
instead a direct causal result of previous
events. Fischer begins his article by restating
Frankfurt’s basic position. He then goes on to
address Don Locke’s criticism of Frankfurt.
“Lock claims, essentially, that a contented
slave is still a slave.”5 Fischer believes that if
responsibility is associated with the agent’s
moral character Frankfurt can be defended
from Locke’s criticism. “On Frankfurt’s
account of responsibility, if the fact that a
desire is irresistible plays a certain role in an
agent’s deliberation, the agent is not
responsible. That is, if an agent believes that a
desire is irresistible and if this belief is a part
of his reason for acting on the desire, then the
agent is not responsible for so acting.”6 If, on
the other hand, the irresistibility of the desire
or coercion plays no part in the agent’s reason
for action then the agent may be responsible.
Fischer examines Locke’s comparison of a
willing and an unwilling drug addict. Locke
claims that both, regardless of willingness, are
still slaves. Fischer examines the motivations
of the two addicts and concludes that while
the willing addict is held responsible for
taking the drug, the unwilling addict is not.
The unwilling addict is not held responsible
because the drug is not taken for any other
reason than because it is irresistible. To hold
the addict responsible for taking something
that cannot be resisted seems counterintuitive. If, instead, the addict takes the drug
because the addict chooses to, it seems
unreasonable to say that the willing addict is
5
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not responsible. The willing addict takes it
because he or she wants to; similarly, a nonaddicted person might take the drug only
because he or she wants too. If the non-addict
is responsible because the drug is taken
willingly, in order to be consistent the willing
addict should also be held responsible. Even
as a slave to the drug, the willing addict takes
the drug not because there is no other option,
but because it is pleasing. The willing addict
may not even be aware of the addictive nature
of the drug. In this way, Locke’s happy slave
criticism seems to still leave us believing that
if the happy slave is willingly doing the
master’s will the slave should be held morally
responsible. Fischer contends that although
Locke’s argument lacks convincingness, two
more arguments can be made in response to
Frankfurt.
The next argument that Fischer
addresses is that one might state that
Frankfurt never successfully separates
responsibility from control. Fischer states,” I
call this the associationist strategy--the
strategy that insists on the association of
responsibility with control.”7 This argument is
based on what Fischer calls the “essentialist
principle.” The essentialist principle states:
two events are the same particular event if
they have the same causal antecedents. There
are two possible causes for the particular
event: “Jones smacks Carl.” As two events
are different if they have different causes, the
particular event of smacking Carl can be
separated into two distinct events: one event
forced by Black, the other chosen by Jones.
Therefore, Frankfurt’s argument is weakened
by the fact that Jones, according to the
essentialist principle, has two different
possibilities from which to choose.
Furthermore, according to the associationist
principle, “a person is morally responsible for
the obtaining of a state of affairs only if he
could have prevented the obtaining of that
state of affairs.” From this one may conclude
that Jones cannot be held responsible for the
state of affairs that Carl is smacked on the
back of the head because he could not have

prevented it happening. “[W]hy not also [hold
him responsible] for something for which he
is obviously not responsible: its being the case
that he votes for Reagan on his own or
2+2=4?”8 Then, according to the
associationist principle and the essentialist
principle, Jones cannot be held responsible for
the particular event or for the universal state
of affairs. Fischer argues that both the
associationist claim and the essentialist
principle are weak. The essentialist principle
may be challenged. The assertion that the
event of turning on the television would in
actuality be two different events if one said
“turn the television on” instead of “turn the
TV on” seems implausible. Regardless of this,
Fischer argues that without attacking the
essentialist principle, the associationist
argument may be criticized. Fischer states that
the associationisist “confuses the ability
deliberately to do otherwise with the
possibility of something different occurring.”9
Simply, the act of Jones being forced to
smack Carl is one that lacks deliberateness on
the part of Jones. Jones, in that instance, is not
acting with rational control. Therefore, it is a
case of something different occurring but not
a case of an alternate choice available to
Jones. Fischer then concludes that Jones, in
this case, still does not have control of the
situation; he has no choice concerning the
inevitable conclusion of the event. Fischer
believes that Frankfurt does effectively
separate responsibility from control. Jones
does lack control. Our intuitions tell us that he
does not have any alternate possibilities.
Nevertheless, we do find him responsible for
his action. Fischer then goes on to attack the
nature of Frankfurt’s determinism.
Fischer breaks determinism down into
two subdivisions. “There are two ways in
which it might be true that one couldn’t have
done otherwise. In the first way, the actual
sequence compels the agent to do what he
does, so he couldn’t have initiated an alternate
sequence; in the second way, there is no
actual-sequence compulsion; but the alternate
8
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sequence would prevent the agent from doing
other than he actually does.”10 Fischer argues
that Frankfurt’s situation is an example of the
second kind. The alternate sequence prevents
the agent from doing otherwise. In Frankfurt’s
examples, it is the nature of the alternate
sequence, and not compulsion to follow the
actual sequence, that necessitates the
inevitable conclusion. One might argue that
the antecedent states of the world, in addition
to causal laws, require that Jones will smack
Carl. Nevertheless, Fischer states that the
events in Frankfurt’s examples are not
nomologically inevitable. Although the event
“Jones smacks Carl” is inevitable, the events
that result in it are not. For an event to be the
result of actual sequence causation, all events
leading up to it must be nomologically
inevitable. If Jones smacks Carl, it is a result
of Jones’ inclination to do so, which is the
result of his serial-smacking-heads disorder,
which is a result of his genetic make-up, and
so on. In Frankfurt’s example there is only
one end result, but there is no actual sequence
causation. “‘Black’s not intervening in
Jones’s decision’ is a non-nomologicallyinevitable component of the actual sequence
(as is the state of affairs, ‘Jones’s deciding on
his own to vote for Reagan.’)”11 Fischer
argues that what rules out responsibility is not
lack of control, but instead actual sequence
compulsion. Lack of control normally points
to actual sequence compulsion, but it does not
have to. “But when lack of control is not
accompanied by actual-sequence compulsion,
we need not rule out responsibility.”12 Fischer
argues that the fact that Frankfurt’s arguments
do not involve actual sequence compulsion
causes a distinct problem. Consider the
following example (adapted from Carl Ginet):
an agent, Dan, is devoutly religious. Now, it
just so happens that Dan is about to take a test
in his Metaphysics class. In order to take the
test Dan must drive to school. Unfortunately
for Dan, it has been raining heavily and he
knows that between the traffic and the rain he

will never make it to class on time. Being
devoutly religious, Dan believes that if he
prays, God will intervene and stop the rain so
that he can make it to his test on time. Dan
decides to not pray to God to stop the rain
because it would be a frivolous misuse of his
relationship with God. In theory, science tells
us that no matter what Dan does, it will
continue to rain. Therefore, there is only one
conclusion: regardless of his action, the rain
will continue. According to Frankfurt: “a
person is not morally responsible for what he
has done if he did it only because he could not
have done otherwise,” but in this case Dan
does not withhold from praying because he
only could not have done otherwise.13 Dan
withholds from praying because he believes it
would be frivolous. Then, according to
Frankfurt, we must hold Dan morally
responsible for the event “Dan does not stop
the rain by praying.” Fischer argues that the
decision to hold Dan responsible is
inconsistent with our intuitions of moral
responsibility. Fischer believes that he can
resolve the argument in the following way:
“The actual sequence of events proceeds in
such a way that the agent’s not stopping the
rain is causally necessitated. Similarly, the
physical laws that obtain (even in a libertarian
world) are such that (given present
technology) it is causally necessitated that no
person can stop the Earth’s rotation. If we
accept the claim that actual-sequence casual
necessitation is incompatible with
responsibility, we can explain why no agent is
morally responsible for failing to stop the
rain.”14 If we hold agents responsible for
events that are causally inevitable, we may
hold them responsible for events that, in
reality, they have no control over.
According to Fischer, Frankfurt does
separate responsibility from control. One does
not need options in order to be held
responsible for one’s intentions. Regardless of
this, Fischer also argues that Frankfurt’s
argument does not actually address what
philosophers usually mean when they say
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“determinism.” Frankfurt’s examples do not
involve actual sequence compulsion.
Determinism, therefore, according to Fischer,
is still incompatible with responsibility.
Frankfurt has not demonstrated that a person
can be held responsible for an action if the
agent’s action is nomologically inevitable.
The conclusion is, then, that when
philosophers state that determinism means “it
could not have been otherwise,” it implies
that all events responsible for the event in
question also could not have been otherwise.
In this sense, even intentions are the result of
previous causes. Frankfurt’s examples are not
examples of determinism. Instead, they are
examples in which a free agent lacks control
of a situation. This does not account for
determinism in its truest sense because every
event that results in the conclusion is not
causally necessitated. Fischer concludes that
responsibility and determinism, in regards to
Frankfurt’s examples, are still incompatible.
The essential question that must be
raised in response to Fischer’s conclusion is
“are our intentions our own?” Fischer has
demonstrated the difficulties of attempting to
break free from the constraints of actual
sequence compulsion. If an agent is
compelled in every way, for every action, to
the point that even his intentions are not his
own, it seems that holding the agent
responsible would be gratuitous. If one
answers, then, that “no, our intentions are not
our own,” agents must be absolved of all
moral responsibility. Even philosophers who
believe that all actions inevitably result in one
unavoidable conclusion might balk at the
concept that their very thoughts do not belong
to them. We believe, for the most part, that
our intentions belong to us. Even if we do not
get to act on them, our intuition tells us that
we are responsible for our intentions. If causal
determinism is correct, then even our
intentions are simply the result of other events
that precede them and we are responsible for
nothing.
This belief, that our choices belong to
us, has a significant impact on how we
delegate moral responsibility. For example,

substantial evidence concerning how strongly
intuitive it is to us to hold individuals
responsible for their actions can be found in
Fischer’s example concerning the rain.
Although it might be correct that Dan is not
responsible for the rain, what if he really-without even a singular doubt--believes he
can make it rain? If, instead of a mild
rainstorm that will prevent him from making
it time to his test, what if he is presented with
a situation in which the rain will result in
someone else’s death? Consider a situation in
which he has a friend who is severely allergic
to water. Dan and his friend look up and see
storm clouds rapidly approaching, and there is
no shelter in sight. If Dan then decides to start
praying for it to rain (and ironically it does
rain) it seems likely that would ask him after
the storm, “why did you try to make it rain?”
Even if we are Atheists and believe there is no
possible way Dan could have stopped the
rain, if Dan’s answer was “I just knew it
would be so much fun to watch my friend
slowly and painfully die due to his allergy,”
we might indignantly argue that Dan is a
horrible person for intending his friend’s
death. It is essential at this point that we
recognize the fact that we hold Dan
responsible, not only for his intentions, but for
his action. We do not hold Dan responsible
for the rain, yet we do hold him responsible
for trying to bring about an event that we
know he, in actually, has no control over. The
response to Fischer’s example concerning the
rain is that Dan is not held responsible for the
event that it rains but instead for the event
“Dan tried to make it rain in order to kill his
friend.” Through this we would be acting as if
he is, in someway, responsible for his friend’s
death. Although we know that he is not
physically responsible for his friend’s death,
if we know he truly believes in his power, we
believe that he should not have tried to make
it rain. In this way we may find someone
responsible for actions that can in no way be
prevented. Fischer’s criticism of Frankfurt
using the original example of an individual
responsible for the rain is incorrect because
Frankfurt does not hold the agent responsible

for events beyond the agent’s control, but
instead holds the agent responsible for his or
her intention in regard to any event,
regardless of control. Frankfurt does
accurately assess how we currently allocate
moral responsibility. We do believe that our
intentions are our own and allocate judgment
in such a way that reflects that belief. Until it
is proven otherwise, we will most likely
continue to hold ourselves responsible for our
actions in regard to those beliefs. This does
not act as proof that our intentions are our
own, only that we believe our intentions to be
our own, and furthermore, we delegate moral
responsibility based on them.
To act because there are no alternative
possibilities can mean one of two things: 1) I
know I have no options; therefore, I do this
because I know I cannot do otherwise or 2) I
cannot do or will to do otherwise regardless
of whether I know I have no options;
therefore, I do this because I cannot do
otherwise. In both of these situations there are
no alternative possibilities, and the agent acts
because there are no alternative possibilities.
In both cases we intuitively absolve the agent
of guilt. If casual determinism is the state of
the universe, then all agents act because they
cannot do otherwise and should not be held
morally accountable. (This is not the agent’s
rationale. Nevertheless, whatever the agent's
rationale is, it is due the fact that it cannot be
otherwise causally.) If, on the other hand, our
intuitions are correct and we can will to do
otherwise, then we can be held accountable
for our intentions when we do not act solely
because we cannot do otherwise despite our
intuitions. Here I must create a distinction that
Frankfurt may not be willing to make. If
agents are free to will despite causal
determination--in situations where they have
no other option--the agents, if they act
because they know they cannot do otherwise,
are not held responsible as Frankfurt
contends. If, on the other hand, causal
determination results in our intentions being
that which they are, and we have no real
control over them, all actions are actions that
we commit because we could not have done

otherwise, and therefore, we are absolved of
all moral responsibility in all cases. Frankfurt
might balk at this and ask, “What about cases
in which the agent shows unbridled joy due to
the action committed?” The response is that
even that “unbridled joy” is only a reaction
that is a result of certain specific causes, the
actor cannot conceive, in reality, of doing
otherwise. In the case of actual sequence
causation, Frankfurt’s assertion that morality
hinges upon “acting solely because one
cannot do otherwise” can be interpreted to
state that casual determinism is incompatible
with responsibility. Simply, the statement
“acting solely because” assumes that the
agent is capable of intending otherwise. If the
agent cannot intend otherwise, Fischer is
correct, the agent cannot be held morally
accountable. With this division in mind it
might well be the case the Fischer is incorrect
when he states that Frankfurt successfully
separates responsibility from control. If it is
the agent’s intention that absolves him—
assuming his intentions are his own—then
there is the tacit assumption that the agent has
control of those intentions. Because of this,
we cannot be certain that Frankfurt actually
separates responsibility from control; instead,
he may only be establishing that we hold
agents responsible for actions only when they
intend the actions
Actual sequence determinism tells us
that whatever we choose to believe, we have
no choice. It may well be the case that the
intuition that we are free to intend as we
choose is delusional. We cannot believe
otherwise, though, because causation dictates
that we believe as we do. Reason, if actual
sequence determinism is the case, indicates
that we are not free in any sense; even our
intentions are not our own. Regardless, even
if we believe we do not have freewill, we will
continue to act as if we do have freewill.
Ironically enough, this is also something that
we, in reality, have no control over. Those
few of us who do act as if they are not
accountable will continue to be labeled
“psychopath” and placed in various kinds of
institutions for the protection of society. We

live in a delusion, but a persistent and
pervasive one. This delusional existence
requires a way to assign moral judgment
within it. Frankfurt’s revised principle of
alternate possibilities is the most effective
means of assigning judgment within the
delusion. As opposed to throwing the theory
out in the face of causal determinacy, we may
use the principle within the realm of our
delusion. With this in mind I argue for what
might be called “Error Theory
Compatibilism.” We are in error concerning
our belief that we are free. We are not free,
and we are not morally responsible, and even
if we believe this we are still bound by society
and language; therefore, we believe--or at
least as a society, act as if--we are free. This
belief is compatible with Frankfurt’s
principle, though in reality it is not
compatible with causal determinism.
Frankfurt challenges the principle of
alternate possibilities by demonstrating
situations in which agents are held
responsible for actions even though they
could not have done otherwise. It is the
agent's intentions that determine his moral
responsibility. Fischer asserts that Frankfurt
does separate responsibility from control.
Frankfurt’s examples are not of actual
sequence compulsion; due to this, Fischer
argues that Frankfurt’s examples do not apply
to causal determinism. I have argued that
Frankfurt’s examples apply to actual sequence
compulsion. Frankfurt’s argument simply
would state that in the case of actual sequence
compulsion, the agent is absolved of moral
responsibility. Furthermore, Fischer is
incorrect; Frankfurt never actually separates
responsibility from control because in
Frankfurt’s examples the agents still have
control of their intentions. Finally, if causal
determinism is the case we cannot be held
responsible for our actions because we are in
no way free, but we do not, for the most part,
believe this. This belief--a result of causation-is compatible with moral judgment. As long
as we hold this belief (which is inevitably left
up to the sequence of causation) it is rational
to use Frankfurt’s revised principle of

alternate possibilities to allocate moral
responsibility.
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